by the Italian disasters, made the Allies turn with more and more reliance to the new belligerent. Not alone in men, money, ships, and munitions did the

ion of command, from which had flowed a succession of costly errors. Hence the United States, being in the war to

Premier, M. Painlevé, defined it-made its representation imperative. The delegation, which was headed by Colonel Edward M. House, and included Admiral Benson and General Bliss, set out on an avowed war mission while peace balloons floated in the air. As the President's reputed bosom confidant, who had been to Europe before on supposed peace missions, Colonel House wa

against Germany. A more comprehensive understanding of their respective needs, in order that their joint efforts attained the h

y. It has been no easy problem to determine how they can be used most effectively, since the independent presentation of requirements by the Allied Governments have been

l, if need be, to winning the war, they are not without limit. But even if they were greater they

ary and naval forces and its resources and energies where they

et to create in effect a great general staff to direct the energies of the cobelligerents and so motivate military strategy that entire nations

ments. Each clamored for men, ships, money, food, munitions, or whatever other war essential it wanted. A lack of coordinated plans and predetermined objectives weakened the scope of America's assistance on account of the scattered and piecemeal methods by which it was obtained. Consequently the United States, while providing for its own war necessities, determined that it must have a voice in arbitrating on the further needs of the Allied nations by weighing them side by side at the

ained owing to a division of command and organization, was braced by the appear

ut none of their reverses or disappointments matters if only the great war power o

"should be of priceless value. Seeing that the guiding principle of the American delegates is to discover how the resources of

uncommitted to any set theory and are relatively free from local European feelings. Their moral compass, so to speak, is less exposed to magnetic aberrations and is more likely t

another were humanized by personal contact and a good feeling established which promised a guaranty against future misunderstanding. The envoys of every nation concerned met with great expectations from America. On that one subject there was a remarkable unity. All

ce, Colonel House thus reported o

ed. Up to the time of the Allied conferences they were not focused. They were not working tog

dations made by the Am

e entire unity of effort, military, naval, and economic, betwe

by the extension of the United States shipping program, that the Government and the people of the United States

s be dispatched to Europe with the least poss

e field of the war organization, diplomatic, naval, milit

ssociates as one. Embraced in this scheme were plans for a combined prosecution of the naval war against the G

ted States, being specified. The pooling arrangement, according to the State Department, guaranteed that full equipment would be available to all American troops sent to Europe during the year 1918. The United States was also to participate in the deliberations of a Supreme War Council which w

gan, the estimated output of new tonnage in 1918, and the framing of a program whereby the importations of all the A

, at an Interallied Naval Council, at financial, shipping, and food councils. All that was to be known of the Allied war situation the American delegates ascertained. They consulted with the British Cabinet, the British Admiralty, and wit

irships were ridiculed by her press writers as examples of American bluff and bluster. Americans thought in exaggerations and talked in superlatives. The United States could not conduct a war in Europe on any such unexampled scale. Neither troops nor transports-supposing the latter could be built, which was doubtful-would reach their destination. German submarines would interpose. Besides, the United States never really intended to make more than a demonstration. It was merely making a flourish. The American army was weak any way and that assured its futility as a factor in the war. It was no better than Rumani

otherwise seen by John St. Loe Strachey, editor

ched. There is only a slight irregularity perceptible on the outline of the sphere, but gradually the inexorable shadow sprea

not be denied than the advance of the shadow! Nothing can hurry it, nothing can de

, so it will be with Ame