ng their war aims through Lloyd-George and President Wilson. But their utterances pointed to a steadfast continuance of t

th of the Lansdowne letter-where national unity in the prosecution of the war was perceived to be in jeopardy. A suspicion was rife that

some misunderstandings and stat

a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations, bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destructio

twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military dominati

deprive Turkey of its capital or the rich lands of A

vernment with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless ever

he first declaration recorded in a previous volume of this history, except with regard to Russia, condi

by any of the Allied statesmen. It definitely committed the United States not only to promoting and safeguarding the peace of Europe but the peace of the world. The frequent question: What was America fighting for

esident's address app

raging the Socialists and liberal elements, and exhibiting the mi

peace offers to Russia and thus bring Russia back into partnership wit

e speech of Lloyd-George and to develop further th

l it was won. The necessity for any restatement of war aims by the United States was regarded as a question for the President to determine, and he had done so at a time when the need was clearly urgent in Gre

ht a reiteration of war aims as a basis for peace negotiations. President Wilson's answer to that suggestion was not confined to a reassertion of America's war objects. While the dove of peace was

stress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the f

on. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a

r resolution with only one dissentient House vote, and on

become convinced that a German peace was certain. Her confidence was stated to be based on the war map, added to a belief that a lack of cohesion and community of spirit prevailed among the Allies, in contrast with her own unified will to victory, and that the United States was m

ance in a speech which constituted a tardy response to the war aims reaffirmed by Lloyd-George and President Wilson. Demanding tha

s. Our highly gifted army leaders face the future with undiminished confidence in victo

conciliation revealed by our proposals must not be regarded by the E

e let them revise their program once again. If they do that and com

peace. The chancellor saw no difference of opinion on the subject of freedom of navigation upon the seas; but it was "highly important for the freedom of shipping in future if strongly fortified naval bases on important international routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hongko

ples as to whose sovereignty they should recognize, was less easily disposed of. The chancello

mpire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the program also wil

ce, that England should not only abandon her naval bases

te Powers having declined to participate in the negotiations between the so-called Russian Gov

isted upon by the United States. The settlement of the Belgian

rritory can offer the only possible basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the stand-point hither

The occupied parts of France are a valued pawn in our hands," said the chancellor. "The conditions and methods of procedure of the evacuation, which must take account of Germany's vit

rn, and the chancellor airily relegated them to Austria-Hungary for consideration. As to Turkey, for whose subject races the President demanded self-government, as well as a free Dardanelles, the chancellor intimated that her integrity vitally concerned

nexed in substance, if not in form. The Baltic provinces of Russia were earmarked for Germany, and Russia, thus cut off from the western seas, was to have icebound Archangel and distant Vladivostok as her only ports. The disposition or division of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro was to be left to Austria-Hungary, with Germany pledged to support her decisions. Armenia, Palestine, and Arabia, were to be returned to the Turks, while as to Constantinople and the Dardanelles no settlement could be permitted that was not agreeable to German imperialism. As to Belgium, the conclusion

proposals for safeguarding peace when it came. Germany sought to be placed in possession of doubled power before she would even talk about creating conditions making for a durable peace. She must

marked and significant as to revive the preexisting belief that the road to peace negotiations would eventually be opened through Austria. Though Count Czernin's speech resolutely upheld the integrity of Austr

ls of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point o

er the war, but also on several concrete questions, and differences which still exist do not appear to

posed of States whose interests are least at variance with one another, tempts one to ask if an exchange of ideas between the two pow

f the critical condition of internal affairs in Austria-Hungary, and sought to make advances that would placate the restless and war-worn people of the dual monarchy without offend

s was so naive as to be amusing if the situation were not so serious. His invitation was not acceptable. The American Government had thrown in its lot with Great Britain, France, and Italy, and was determined to stand or fall with them. His attempt to promote a separate peace between Austria and the

nd that the Austrian minister was the first of their spokesmen to show breadth and detachment, the contrast between the two speeches indicated Germanesque stage play. Germany'

ace terms except her own. Count Czernin's conciliatory tone was discounted by his declared fidelity to Austria's alliance to Germany. The two sp

everal points, but President Wilson manifestly was the chief objective of the converging forces. Neither s

t against the latter's aspirations, were impotent unless energized by a revolution in the dual monarchy. The British only took cognizance of Count von Hertling's words, which confirmed the prevalent belief that Prussian militari