oyments of B

cessary accessories of an army, without which it cannot make war, such as its transport and its equipment, have had to be changed with the circumstances of each incident. Just as it has been impossible to preserve throughout all its parts one uniform pattern, such as is established everywhere by the nations of the Continent, so it has not been possible to have ready either the suitable clothing, the most convenient equipment, or the transport best adapted for the particular campaign which it happened to be at the moment necessary to undertake. More serious than this, and more vital in its effect on the contest about to be described, was the fact that the services thus required continually of British troops prevented the formation of larger bodies of definite organisation in which the whole staff, needed to give vitality and unity to anything more than a battalion or a brigade, was trained together. For such wars as those in Egypt, or for the earlier wars in South Africa, in Canada, or in many other countries, it was much more practical to select for each enterprise the men whose experience suited them for the particular circumstances, and form staffs as well as corps of the kind that were needed, both in strength and composition, for that especial work. This was a very serious disadvantage, when it came to be necessary to make up a great host, in which not a certain n

forces o

e the geography, almost as significant. Always it had been assumed that, if at any time some addition was necessary to reinforce these far extended outposts of Empire, it was to be provided from the regular army stationed at home. Up to the year 1888 no official declaration had ever been made of the purposes for which the home army was to be used. In that year Mr. Stanhope issued the necessarily often mentioned memorandum, which declared that, though it was highly improbable that so large a force would ever be required, yet two army corps, with a cavalry division, or a total of 81,952 men, were to be available for the purposes of action beyond the seas. As will be seen from the chapter on the work of the Navy, it was only in the year 1899 that the Admiralty, who necessarily would have to transport whatever strength was thus employed, became aware for the first time that the War Office would need shipping for more than one army corps. The British army has had more, and more varied, service during the nineteenth century than any other in the world. It undoubtedly included more officers and men, who had experienced what it meant to be under fire, than any other. But these experiences had all been gained in comparatively small detachments, and each was so unlike that of any other, that it was practically impossible that those trainings by service, which are much more efficient in their influence on the practical action of an army than any prescript

White

of October 9, 1899, the British re

Non-Commissioned

y 780

Royal Field Arti

n Artillery[8

gineers

y 4,362

ice Corps

Department and

Medical Cor

artment and

inary Depa

3 21

ll ranks

he surface of the globe should be realised. The remarks which have been made as to the special ca

troops on the seas,

aval ba

aval base at Si

aval base at S

ados

(Naval b

es at Esquimault

base at Trin

base at Hon

te

rus

pt

(Naval b

aic

(Naval b

s (Naval

(Coaling

ts (Naval base at

lar Ser

garrison of

(exclusive of R

-

7,

r, will be best understood when the figures which follow have been considered, and the yet greater area of the earth's surface covered by those who served under t

ngth and d

(exclusive of the Royal Marines, but inclusive of local colonial nav

ther ranks.

European) on O

s 9,173 217

1,803 81,

a Artiller

lar

ean Officers, Native T

318

Army o

Officers, Native Troops

- 18,64

191

ad Cont

uropeans) 121 7

Service

Officers) - 18,2

ops of the Un

,036 106,

654 9,4

8,020 215

tillery Compa

344

nteers - -

ry Police - -

Militia 150 3,

ia 60 1,755

lice 26 7

na

ar troops 9

,398 28,4

g 92 Newfoundlan

orces 5

- 3

rala

outh

lar troops

228 3,

rs 97 2,

111 1,5

e - -

orces 3

- 1

ens

lar troops

198 2,

ers 50

ts -

ce -

lubs -

Forces

- 8

Aust

ular troo

a 72 6

es 40

ce -

lubs -

Forces

- 2

man

ular troo

rs 88 1,

s 8 2

ce -

- 2

tor

lar troops

158 2,

rs 110 1

Forces

- 5

Austr

lar troops

ers 46

- 1

Zeal

lar troops

rs 330 6

orces 3

- 7

i

ers 19

e 16

--

Col

ar troops 3

rs 186 3

s - -

e - -

fle Clubs

- 9

ta

rs 112 1

s - -

ce -

orces 6

- 3

des

sed by Col. Baden-Powe

sian

outh Afri

ula

- - 5

uto

- - 2

land Pro

14 190

Ind

a 23 5

rs 122 1

54 2,92

- 5

and I

ers 3 7

ies i

ops (Malay State

rs 93 1,

47 2,88

- 5

He

ers 4 5

Afr

r troops 219

ers 11

40 2,20

orces 1

- 6

otal 1,

CENTRAL

Britain. The majority of their inhabitants were, and still are, but semi-civilised or wholly savage, and internal order has often to be maintained by serious fighting. In 1899 the force i